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Abstract 
 
Anticipating or responding to European public concerns over agbiotech, state bodies have sponsored 
participatory exercises in technology assessment (TA). Some participants have sought to open up 
technological decisions vis-à-vis alternative futures and normative choices, but such efforts have been 
marginalized; the trajectory of biotechnological innovation has been protected from challenge. 
Questions about agbiotech as control have been displaced and channeled into regulatory issues and 
control measures. To some extent, participatory TA exercises have helped to hold governments 
accountable for regulatory criteria, but not for innovation choices. These participatory TA exercises 
generally internalize assumptions about agbiotech as societal progress.  Despite aspirations to 
democratize technological choices, the exercises tend to biotechnologise democracy. The prospects for 
democratization depend upon wider, autonomous forms of participation — neither sponsored nor 
welcomed by state bodies. 
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Public participation in techno-scientific issues has recently gained mainstream support in Europe, in 
response to greater conflict around innovation and regulation of controversial technologies. Scholars 
of Science, Technology and Society (STS) have played key roles in stimulating or organizing such 
participation. But participation exercises have attracted diverse views regarding their appropriate 
design, roles and consequences. They have also attracted various criticisms, including that participants 
are not representative of the public, or that the government does not make a prior commitment to 
follow the views expressed there, or that technical aspects are separated from other issues.   
These criticisms may be accurate descriptively but they also imply particular benchmarks, 
even simplistic models, of direct democracy. Together they imply that participants truly representing 
the public could guide government decisions – as if the government had no agenda of its own, or no 
wider accountability to representative democracy. Amidst proposals for participation, there are diverse 
models of what would count as a democratic assessment of technology (Joss 1998:4).  According to a 
survey of participatory technology assessment (TA) exercises, these models rarely have a 
demonstrable impact on political decision-making (Bütschi and Nentwich 2002).   
Perhaps TA exercises matter in more subtle ways, which therefore demand different analytical 
questions regarding how to identify or assess democratic accountability. For some analysts of 
participatory TA, at issue is “how to make those in charge accountable” and thus “how to organize 
effective accountability” for government decisions (Hagendijk and Irwin 2006:56-57). Some echo 
concerns that participatory methods may “subvert broader democratic political processes” or may not 
be “fit for purpose” (Burgess and Chilvers 2006). Participatory TA has been seen as supplementing 
older political forms of accountability with broader social forms. But this aim leaves open other 
difficult questions, including “who is holding whom accountable, and by which means?” (Abels 
2007:111). 
As a case study for such analysis, this paper focuses on agricultural biotechnology, a sector 
which has faced extraordinary public protest in Europe. Agbiotech has attracted diverse forms of 
public participation, including open mass meetings, protests, boycotts, mass-media stunts and even 
sabotage. Through these means, an emerging citizenry has demanded government accountability for 
innovation choices.  Among the various responses, many state bodies across Europe have sponsored 
formal participatory exercises, beyond simply guaranteeing access to regulatory procedures. In short, 
agbiotech provides a rich, multi-country case study. 
This paper discusses the following questions:   
• How and why did state bodies sponsor participatory TA of agbiotech?  
• What aims arose in designing, managing and using those exercises? 
• What was the relevance of TA exercises in democratizing agbiotech? 
Democratizing Technology – or Managing Conflict? 
 
Participatory technology assessment has been promoted as a means to democratize technology, in 
particular by enhancing the public accountability of innovation trajectories. To accomplish this, 
participatory design should acknowledge that science and innovation are social, cultural and 
institutional activities.  
As such, public engagement offers a way to be more accountable for the particular values and 
interests, which underpin both the governance of science and the general use of science in 
governance...  Public engagement holds greatest value when it occurs “upstream” – at the earliest 
stages in the process of research or science-informed policy making… In practice, the relationship 
between representative democracy and participatory methods becomes most clear and complementary, 
when engagement is approached as a means to “open up” the range of possible decisions, rather than 
as a way to close this down. Choice among the options thereby identified then becomes a clearer 
matter of democratic accountability (Stirling 2006:5; cf. Stirling 2005).  
Achieving such accountability depends upon the aims, design and management of the process. 
However, public participation in technological issues has had diverse agendas. According to 
Lars Klüver (2006, cf. 1995), a long-time advocate at the Danish Board of Technology, public 
participation has recently become mainstreamed, along with changes in its policy role. Originally it 
was promoted as a vehicle for democratization and citizen empowerment, so that people could 
challenge policy assumptions and influence decisions. Now public participation goes hand-in-hand 
with liberalism: politics is seen as an open marketplace of opinions, to which citizens should be 
invited (cf. Popper 1962).   
With this participation has become yet another governance tool among others for, as 
examples, adjusting, supplementing or enhancing the policy process. Aware that they often lack public 
confidence, policymakers seek methods of upstream conflict-management. Klüver argues (2006) that 
these professional reasons have recently driven interest by mainstream institutions in public 
participation and will continue to do so. 
Upstream conflict-management restricts the role of participants. In the UK, for example, there 
have been various proposals for “upstream public engagement” between the public and scientists at an 
early stage (e.g. HM Treasury/DTI/DfES, 2004:105). Such engagement has been advocated as means 
to deliberate over possible innovation choices and thereby to make them more accountable (e.g. 
Wilsdon and Willis 2004). By contrast to those ambitious aims:  
[Public engagement] is sometimes portrayed as a way of addressing the impacts of technology – be they 
health, social, environmental or ethical – rather than helping to shape the trajectory of technological 
development. The hope is that engagement can be used to head off controversy … (Wilsdon et al. 2005:33). 
Indeed, conflict-avoidance or conflict-management may be built into the design of public engagement. 
Rather than evaluating participatory TA according to an ideal model, each case should be seen as an 
arena for diverse strategies, including for how to represent agbiotech, the public and relevant 
expertise.   
Denmark 1987: Sustainable Agriculture? 
 
The Danish consensus conference has been advocated as a “counter-technocracy,” a means to 
challenge expert claims through a deliberative process. A lay panel has no vested interest that differs 
from the general public, and any report issued by it helps to promote technology assessment (TA) as a 
broad societal process. The consensus conference extends a Danish tradition of folkeoplysnig: people's 
enlightenment through an adult education network which builds a reflective, informed citizenry (Joss 
1998:20). As its guiding principle, “a well-functioning democracy requires a well-educated and 
engaged population.”  
Successful consensus conference participation is understood in Denmark, for example, in the 
way articulated by a participant: “We initiated a really good assessment process among the public” 
(cited in Klüver 1995:41,43). In a Danish consensus conference, then, “interested citizens” personify a 
political culture in which technological decisions are held accountable to public debate, mediated by 
Parliament. 
Denmark's debate on agricultural biotechnology was initiated in the mid-1980s by 
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Friend of the Earth (FoE) published “debate 
booklets”, proposing new legislation to regulate releases of genetically modified organizations 
(GMOs). In response to public concerns, a Parliamentary “green” majority imposed a statutory ban, in 
the 1986 Gene Technology Act. GMO releases would not be permitted unless there was sufficient 
knowledge about the ecological consequences (Toft 1996). 
With this wording, the Danish government could be held accountable to demonstrate such 
knowledge for risk assessment; this burden of evidence meant a de facto ban for several years. 
Parliament also mandated funds for an information campaign on biotechnology. Some funds were 
specially earmarked for NGOs, especially FoE and some trade unions, in order to stimulate further 
debate on the advantages and disadvantages of biotechnology. In these ways, environmental NGOs 
gained extra resources and political opportunities to frame the issues for further public debate. In turn, 
FoE organized ten public conferences on the wider environmental consequences, on sustainable 
agriculture including organic agriculture, on food labelling, on animal welfare and ethics, on the Third 
World, on seed diversity (including patents), and on biological warfare. These debates were reported 
through a series of publications and statements from FoE.1  
In this context the Danish Board of Technology held its first consensus conference in 1987 on 
“Gene Technology in Industry and Agriculture,” timed to coincide with the Parliamentary debate on 
this issue (Hansen et al. 1992; Klüver 1995:44). In its report the lay panel took up risk issues as well as 
ethical ones (Teknologinævnet 1987). Accepting a key recommendation, Parliament voted to exclude 
animals from the 1987-90 national research & development program for gene technology. The 
conference eventually had more profound effects on the Danish regulatory regime through wider 
public debate.   
A further information campaign was coordinated by the Board of Technology and 
Danish Adult Education Association. During 1987-1990 they supported more than 500 local 
meetings all over the country in order to stimulate debate on human and non-human uses of 
biotechnology, including concerns about risk and ethics. Environmental NGOs were often 
invited to speak, as the most visible critical actors on the scene. 
The government also funded a subsequent program, organized by trade unions, to stimulate 
further debate on the advantages and disadvantages of agbiotech. Their educational materials posed 
questions about sustainable agriculture, including, for example, whether genetically modified crops 
would alleviate or aggravate existing problems of crop monocultures (Elert 1991:12). Through this 
wider debate, the consensus conference indirectly influenced Parliament and thus regulatory policy.   
The Danish regulatory procedure can be contrasted to the mid-1990s EU-wide regulatory 
procedure. In the latter the dominant member states implicitly took for granted the eco-efficiency 
benefits of herbicide-tolerant crops, while disregarding the herbicide implications or assuming them to 
be benign (Levidow et al. 1996, 2000). By contrast, Danish regulators have been held accountable 
publicly for assessing the broad implications of GM crops for agricultural strategy, herbicide usage 
and the environment. Such judgments are scrutinized by Parliament’s Environment Committee, often 
by drawing upon specific questions from NGOs. Under such domestic pressures, Danish 
representatives in turn proposed that EU-wide risk assessments evaluate those implications at the EU 
level (Toft 1996, 2000).  This proposal was eventually accepted in the late 1990s (Levidow et al. 
2000).  
In short, Danish citizen participation enhances government accountability for regulatory 
criteria by going beyond optimistic assumptions about environmental benefits.  GM crops are 
subjected in Denmark to criteria of sustainable agriculture, which in turn are opened up to the lay 
expertise of agbiotech critics. Environmental NGOs thereby find greater scope to influence regulatory 
procedures and expertise.   
However, agri-innovation choices became more contentious in Denmark in the late 1990s. 
NGOs demanded alternatives to agbiotech and to intensive agricultural methods. In a 1999 consensus 
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conference, the lay panel asserted the need for extra measures – not only for product safety, but also to 
prevent GM products “becoming controlled by monopolistic companies” and to evaluate ethical issues 
(Einsiedel 2001).  As conference organizers emphasized, these proposals were expressing citizen 
viewpoints, thus providing a basis for dialogue with decision-makers (Teknologinævnet 1999). The 
panel’s proposals challenged the assumptions and limits of the EU legislative framework. Yet public 
demands for accountability were being channeled into more stringent measures to regulate biophysical 
risks. This pervasive tension has parallels in later TA exercises.  
Germany 1991-92: Participation Trap 
Since the time that the German government promoted agbiotech, in the 1980s, this policy has provoked 
widespread protest –from the Green Party, from environmentalist groups and from local campaigns. Although 
critics gained high-profile attention in the mass media and civil society, their views remained marginal to official 
procedures, unlike German corporatist arrangements for labor issues. Opposition to agbiotech split civil society 
and the major political parties (Gill 1996).   
Public controversy in Germany focused on herbicide-tolerant crops, given their potential for 
spreading this trait and thus changing patterns of herbicide usage. To address such conflicts, the 
government in the early 1990s sponsored a TA exercise on GM herbicide-resistant crops. Funding 
came from the Ministry of Industry and Research, which was strongly promoting biotechnology. It 
was initiated and coordinated by the Berlin Wissenschaftszentrum (Science Centre) as an experiment in 
environmental conflict management. The fifty-odd participants had quasi-expert roles: they included 
overt proponents and opponents of HR crops as well as representatives of regulatory authorities, 
agricultural associations, consumer organizations, and others.  
From the start, conflict erupted over how to define the relevant scientific issues and the 
expertise needed to evaluate them. Organizers argued that broad participation was needed in the TA 
exercise in order to deliberate over the arguments arising in the polarized public debate on agbiotech. 
The TA exercise was designed to evaluate the arguments for and against herbicide-resistance GM 
technology, and particularly its possible consequences. It was not designed to evaluate alternative 
options for weed control in agriculture. Thus the procedure was “a technology-induced TA, not a 
problem-induced TA” (van den Daele 1995:74). 
Environmental NGOs at the TA exercise nonetheless advocated a problem-induced approach. 
They wanted participants to compare biotechnology products with other potential weed-control 
methods, as alternative solutions to agricultural problems. However, this proposal was rejected by the 
organizers (Gill 1993). Consequently, the narrow remit set difficult terms for participation by the 
broadly representative individuals from NGOs – indeed, difficult terms for their expert status.   
As organizers acknowledged, “The TA implicitly accepted the matter-of-course development 
of technology as the starting point” as well as possible risks as the main grounds for state restrictions: 
“If critics fail to provide evidence of relevant risks, the technology cannot be banned.” So critics held 
the burden of evidence for any risks. Advocates held the burden to demonstrate benefits, though 
failure to do so would have no bearing upon regulatory decisions (van den Daele 1995:75).  This 
framework marginalized alternative agronomic solutions while reinforcing the dominant system, and 
thus exemplified “intensive farming as the reference system.” Within this framework, participants 
themselves defined their controversies as debates about empirical evidence, for example regarding the 
possibility of environmental damage – not about values and goals (van den Daele 1995:76-77).    
The organizers aimed to include and deliberate all viewpoints on risk-benefit issues. By 
subjecting expert views to scrutiny, the TA could reach conclusions about empirical claims, rather 
than political or ethical ones. “This procedure placed participants under massive pressure either to 
admit consensus or justify dissent,” especially through detailed empirical evidence (van den Daele 
1995:80).   
From NGOs’ standpoint, the technology-induced TA framework effectively favored experts in 
specialized technical areas, as examples in gene flow and herbicide effects. In practice, the TA 
exercise set a lower burden of evidence for demonstrating benefits than for demonstrating risks, during 
a period before much empirical research had been done on risk scenarios. Consequently, the 
discussion emphasized environmental benefits, especially the prospects for farmers to use less harmful 
herbicides and or lower quantities of them (Gill 1993).    
On the basis of expert reports, the TA symbolically normalized any risks. According to 
agbiotech proponents, echoing the government’s advisory body, any risks from GM herbicide-tolerant 
crops are similar to those from conventional crop plants and herbicide usage. “In many areas it was 
argued that there was no need for political action because the identifiable problems could be dealt with 
in the established registration procedures…. if one agreed to the ‘normalization’ of the risks” (van den 
Daele 1995:82). In this way, the TA exercise undermined NGO claims about novel or unknown risks; 
once normalized, any risks are manageable through regulatory procedures, even contemporary ones.   
A technology-induced TA framework poses a dilemma of participation for agbiotech critics. 
Once they enter the exercise, “They have to criticize a technology which promises to satisfy some 
needs which may even be produced by the technology itself …” (Gill 1993:74). That is, putative 
benefits satisfy “needs” which are predefined by biotechnological solutions for intensive monoculture. 
A technology-induced TA thereby tends to accept and reproduce the social vision built into the 
technology. Environmental NGOs and their associated research institutes face a difficult choice: either 
play a quasi-expert role within this framework and thus help legitimize it or abandon this role and be 
treated as merely lay voices.  
After much conflict, environmental NGOs and their associated research institutes decided to 
withdraw before the TA exercise reported its conclusions  They gave several reasons for withdrawing, 
including that their voluntary participation was occupying too much time, especially the task of 
commenting on long expert reports (van den Daele, 1995:81).  According to an NGO expert, “I had 
not imagined that you could destroy participation by throwing paper on top of people” (cited in 
Charles 2001:107). By withdrawing, they could devote more resources to public protest and preserve 
their credibility with NGO members and activists (Gill 1993:81-82).   
But they were criticized for withdrawing by the WZB coordinator:  
One cannot present one’s position in public as scientifically substantiated and then cast 
fundamental doubt on science as neutral...  Participation in the procedure implies the readiness to 
submit oneself on the empirical issues to the judgment of science (van den Daele 1995:84; also 
1994).   
However, at issue was the range of questions to be answered by science, their normative assumptions, 
and the alternative technological options to be considered as comparators for agri-environmental 
assessments. Some questions from participants were pre-empted or marginalized by the TA exercise, 
in particular by constructing particular boundaries between expert and lay voices.   
Societal futures were reduced to scientific issues, readily assessable by experts in “the state of 
the art.” Civil society representatives thereby found themselves in a “participation trap:” they could 
either participate within the government’s risk-benefit framework for GM crops per se or else be 
marginalized. Overall the exercise reinforced the government’s policy framework and its public 
unaccountability.  In a similar way, societal conflict over agri-innovation issues was channelled into 
risk assessment through regulatory procedures. Together these practices extended and reinforced the 
Rechtsstaat, at least until government policy began to change in 2002. 
France 1998: A Benign Technocratic State 
 
By 1997 French regulatory policy faced a legitimacy crisis.  France had led efforts to gain EU-wide 
approval for GM crops, but now these were opposed by a broad range of organizations.  The 
Confederation Paysanne, representing farmers who elaborated a peasant identity, opposed agbiotech 
while counterposing “quality” alternatives to industrialized agriculture (Heller 2002). An oppositional 
petition was signed by many prominent scientists, not necessarily anti-agbiotech, but all of them 
concerned about failures of regulators to develop appropriate ecological expertise and risk research 
(Marris 2001).   
In February 1997 the Prime Minister decided not to authorize commercial cultivation of Ciba-
Geigy’s Bt 176 GM maize in France, even though French regulators had led EU authorization of the 
same product. This unstable policy indicated a crisis of official expertise within an elite-technocratic 
political culture. According to some critics, an official “objectivity” too narrowly defined the relevant 
expertise. As an alternative approach, expert procedures would open up a scientific critique of possible 
options; this space would provide the expertise necessary for decisions (Roqueplo, 1996:67, my 
paraphrase). By incorporating counter-expertise, regulatory procedures would develop an expertise 
contradictoire (contradictory expertise) which would enhance democratic debate and state 
accountability for decisions.  
In November 1997 the government announced a set of measures, including a plan to sponsor a 
consensus conference on GMOs, with reference to the Danish Model. This event was later officially 
called a Citizens’ Conference. As an official rationale, it was said by the Ministry of Agriculture to 
provide “a new way of elaborating decisions' and a means to implement 'participatory democracy.” 
Yet the government never clarified the relation between the citizens’ conference and its own decision-
making procedure (Marris and Joly 1999).  This relation was subtly played out within the conference 
process, in particular by how expert roles were defined. 
From the start, the conference was designed to re-assert the benign expertise of the state, 
especially the Parliament which saw itself as the only legitimate representative of the Nation. 
Organization of the citizens’ conference was delegated to a Parliamentary unit, Office Parlementaire 
d'Évaluation des Choix Scientifiques et Technologiques (OPECST), which symbolized a political 
neutrality separate from the government. OPECST appointed the steering committee, which in turn 
decided that the panel membership should represent diverse views of ordinary citizens – rather than 
stakeholders in the debate. It also decided which “experts” – all of them scientists – would give 
briefings or testimony to the panel, thus framing the issues in advance (Marris and Joly 1999).  
Organizers saw these arrangements as necessary “to prepare a public debate which is not taken over by 
one side or the other,” that is to correct or avoid biases in the existing public debate (OPECST 1998a). 
Implicitly, such biases included anti-agbiotech NGOs on one side and Monsanto on the other, 
especially from the perspective of the Left-Green Parliamentary majority.   
Held in 1998, the conference included different framings of the policy problem. At the public 
hearings, the citizens’ panel often challenged claims by experts about risks and benefits of GM crops. 
According to this panel’s report, control by multinational companies could threaten farmers' 
independence. Genetically altered species pose a risk of standardization. And GM rapeseed poses 
known risks of uncontrolled proliferation, both through pollen and seeds.  Nevertheless GM crops 
could bring economic benefits to European agriculture (OPECST 1998b; Boy et al. 1998).   
Taken together these arguments implied the need for national public-sector expertise in 
agbiotech innovation.  
The panel’s recommendations focused on institutional arrangements for better managing agricultural 
biotechnology.  Such measures included the following: greater social participation in scientific advice; 
public-sector research on ecological risks and agbiotech innovation; a system to ensure traceability of 
food derived from GM crops; and adequate labeling to inform consumer choice. “Until these 
conditions are satisfied, part of the panel believes that a moratorium would be advisable” (OPECST 
1998b; Boy et al. 1998). By advocating state funds for agbiotech innovation, the panel accepted the 
government’s problem-definition of a national technological gap whose solution requires public-
funded science, presumed to be benign. The panel’s concerns about rapeseed complemented the 
French government’s decision to oppose approval of GM herbicide-tolerant rape, on grounds that gene 
flow could complicate weed control (Marris and Joly 1999).   
The panel’s conclusions were translated into policy advice by the Parliamentary organizers, as 
if they were neutral experts operating in the public good. Moreover, having attended the proceedings, 
the OPECST President presumed to speak for the panel:  
Taking all these views into account he then himself adopted a position on a number of topics… He 
has identified the issues and looked into peoples’ fears and concerns (OPECST 1998b).   
This translation can be illustrated by the strategic issue of how to structure expert advice. The panel 
had proposed that a citizens' commission should be part of the scientific advisory committee. Yet 
OPECST recommended instead that it be kept separate, because this could better perpetuate a neutral 
image of scientific advice and thus reinforce a boundary between expert and lay roles.  
The panel’s advice anticipated the general direction of government policy: more stringent 
regulatory criteria, risk assessment by a broader scientific expertise, and “independent” risk research 
which was equated with public-sector institutes. It helped to legitimize and reinforce such initiatives, 
which heretofore had not been universally accepted within the government. In June 1998 the 
government announced measures along those lines (Marris and Joly 1999). Institutional reforms 
emphasized expert procedures to minimize the risks and enhance the benefits of a controversial 
technology.   
Despite its limitations, the citizens’ conference initiated a new form of active public 
representation and knowledge-production. Panel members explored techno-scientific and social 
aspects together from the perspective of ordinary citizens. They sought to inform decision-makers 
about the views of those who do not normally speak out – and who do not feel represented by political 
parties, trade unions, or environmental and consumer NGOs. However, this potential for participatory 
evaluation, especially for considering alternative options, was limited by the overall structure, 
especially the small opportunity to interact with designated experts (Joly et al. 2003).   
Overall the citizens’ conference was used to legitimize state claims to represent the public 
good, especially through expert roles. OPECST selectively promoted some accounts of agbiotech and 
its regulation as the expert ones, while explicitly speaking on behalf of citizens. The Agriculture 
Ministry had claimed to implement “participatory democracy,” yet the exercise extended the French 
tradition of technocratic governance (Marris and Joly 1999).   
Within this framework, expert roles remained the exclusive realm of the state authorities and 
their officially designated advisors. Ordinary people could question experts and recommend 
institutional reforms, but Parliamentary experts would speak officially for them. Thus the process 
reinforced lay/expert boundaries, in the face of public challenges to the official expertise for 
agbiotech.  
UK 2003 Public Dialogue: Policing Boundaries 
 
From the late 1990s onwards the UK had a widespread public controversy over agbiotech. Protest 
actions and attacks on field trials gained public support by linking GM crops with various issues – 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and other food scares, globalization, ‘pollution’, and 
others (Levidow 2000). The government faced an impasse over regulatory decisions, especially over 
the criteria for permitting a GM herbicide-tolerant maize which the EU had approved in 1998. As a 
key issue, conservation agencies had warned that changes in herbicide usage could harm farmland 
biodiversity, so the government funded farm-scale trials to monitor such effects.  
To address wider issues beyond risk regulation, the government had created the Agricultural 
and Environment Biotechnology Commission in 2000. Its report, Crops on Trial, advised the 
government to initiate an “open and inclusive process of decision-making” within a framework that 
extends to broader questions, beyond herbicide effects. It proposed a “wider public debate involving a 
series of regional discussion meetings” (AEBC 2001:19, 25). The government was persuaded to 
sponsor this, alongside the intense, sporadic debate which was unfolding anyway.   
Called “GM Nation?,” the official public debate was carried out in summer 2003. Beforehand 
the government promised vaguely “to take public opinion into account as far as possible.” The 
exercise was designed for the organizers to gauge public opinion rather than for participants to 
deliberate a collective view on expert matters (Horlick-Jones et al. 2006). “GM Nation?” also aimed to 
elicit views of the ordinary public, rather than organizational representatives – an artificial distinction, 
given that most civil society organizations and wider social networks had discussed agbiotech in 
previous years.   
An overall Public Dialogue had a tripartite structure which explicitly distinguished between 
lay and expert issues.  “GM Nation?” was designed mainly for the lay public. An expert panel carried 
out a Science Review of literature relevant to risk assessment. And a government department carried 
out a Costs and Benefits Review of GM crop cultivation in the UK.   
The Public Dialogue was designed in these three separate parts, with an explicit aim that they 
would work closely together. The three procedures were kept formally separate, yet the supposedly lay 
and expert issues became intermingled in practice. The official boundaries were both challenged and 
policed, thus constructing the participants in contradictory ways.   
 
Representing Public Views? 
 
“GM Nation?” featured several hundred public meetings open to anyone interested, and drew over 
20,000 participants (DTI 2003). When participants in “GM Nation?” largely expressed critical or 
skeptical views towards agbiotech, arguments ensued over whether they were “representative” of the 
public.  According to a pro-agbiotech coalition, the Agriculture and Biotechnology Council, the 
exercise had been hijacked by anti-biotech activists, so the format was not conducive to a balanced 
deliberation of the issues.   
According to academic analyses, however, such a line of criticism frames the public as 
atomised individuals who have no prior opinion. By contrast, the “GM Nation?” exercise predictably 
drew a more specialized public, largely suspicious or hostile to agbiotech. Participants represented 
both themselves as individuals and wider epistemic networks. The debates were filling an institutional 
void, in the absence of any other formal opportunity to deliberate the wider issues (Reynolds and 
Szerszynski 2006). 
The government sponsors had asked the contractors to involve “people at the grass-roots level 
whose voice has not been heard.” As official evaluators noted afterwards, however, it was problematic 
to distinguish clearly between “an activist minority” and a “disengaged, grass-roots minority.” Many 
participants in “GM Nation?” were politically engaged in the sense that their beliefs on GM issues 
formed part of their wider worldview. Yet policymakers tend to construct “the public” as an even-
handed majority, and therefore legitimately entitled to participate in engagement exercises (Horlick-
Jones et al. 2004:135; Horlick-Jones et al. 2006). Indeed, “grass-roots” conventionally means locally 
organized activists, but this term was strangely inverted to mean a passive, uninformed public. 
As envisaged by the sponsors, separate focus groups would allow the public to frame the 
issues according to their own concerns, and yet special measures were needed to realize policymakers’ 
model of the public. They saw the open meetings being dominated by anti-biotech activists, 
unrepresentative of the general public. Politically inactive citizens were seen as truly representative 
and thus as valid sources of public opinion, unlike “activists.” To exclude the latter individuals from 
focus groups, candidates underwent surveillance and screening. “Perhaps paradoxically, the desire to 
allow the public to frame the discussion in their own terms led the organizers to rely on private and 
closely monitored forms of social interaction.” According to this ideal model of the focus groups, the 
organizers would be listening to the idiotis, by analogy to ancient Greek citizens too ignorant to fulfill 
their responsibilities (Lezaun and Soneryd 2006:22-23). In this way, more informed, expert citizens 
would be excluded from representing the public.  
“GM Nation?” was intended to canvass all views and concerns about agbiotech, but there 
were boundary disputes over issue-framings, admissible arguments and participants’ roles. Some used 
the opportunity as politically engaged actors in their own right, not just as indicators of public opinion.  
Attending shortly after the US-UK attack on Iraq, some participants drew analogies between 
government claims about agbiotech and about Weapons of Mass Destruction. They suspected that the 
government was concealing or distorting information in both cases; they wondered whether it would 
ignore public opinion towards agbiotech, as in the attack on Iraq. Initially the chair tried to steer the 
discussion back to agbiotech, on grounds that “GM Nation?” was not about the Iraq war, though 
participants still elaborated the analogy.  Thus the public consultation had a disjuncture between 
public politics and government policy as understood by the sponsors of the exercise (Joss 2005b:181).   
 
Expert/Lay Roles 
 
For the carefully selected focus groups, the organizers commissioned “stimulus material” so 
participants would have a common knowledge-basis for discussion. The Steering Group asked the 
contractors to supply “objective” information. Yet there were grounds to include “opposing views” 
because “this is often how people encounter information in real lifem” according to official evaluators 
of “GM Nation?.” The material did ultimately include divergent views, but their sources were 
removed from the workbook for focus groups. Afterwards official evaluators questioned “the extent to 
which information is meaningful if it is decontextualized by stripping it from its source” (Horlick-
Jones et al. 2004:93-94; Walls et al. 2005).   
Indeed, people often make judgments on the institutional source of expert views, but they had 
little basis to do so in “GM Nation?” focus groups. Omission of the sources was not simply a design 
deficiency in the exercise. By default, the issue of expert credibility was diverted and reduced to 
scientific information about biophysical risk. Participants had little basis to evaluate such information, 
so the exercise constructed a lay/expert boundary which constrained public roles even more narrowly 
than in the wider public debate. 
Separate from “GM Nation?,” the GM Science Review (2003) was officially limited to a panel 
of experts evaluating scientific information. As a high-profile part of this Review, the Royal Society 
announced a meeting to “examine the scientific basis” of various positions. Opening the event, the 
chair announced the laudable aim “to clarify what we know and do not know” about potential effects 
of GM crops. In the morning, agro-ecological issues were analysed in a rigorous way, especially for 
their relevance to the prospect that broad-spectrum herbicides may be widely used in the future.  But 
those complexities were ignored when considering GM herbicide-tolerant crops in the afternoon 
(Levidow 2003). By downplaying expert ignorance, the overall structure did not facilitate a debate 
about knowledge versus ignorance, nor provide much basis for public involvement. 
Moreover, the boundaries of “science” were policed along pro-biotech lines. Inconvenient 
issues, findings or views were deemed non-scientific. For example, speakers freely advocated the need 
for agbiotech to solve global problems, such as environmental degradation, the food supply and others, 
but the chair cut off anyone who questioned these claims – for going beyond science (Levidow 2003). 
Thus biotechnological framing assumptions were reinforced as “science,” along with the expert status 
of their proponents – while skeptics were marginalized as merely expressing lay views on extra-
scientific issues.  
In sum, the UK Public Dialogue involved a struggle over how to construct the public, 
especially in relation to expertise. The structure and management imposed boundaries between 
apolitical grassroots versus activists, as well as between lay versus expert status. Nevertheless 
participants challenged those boundaries, performed different models of the public, and questioned 
dominant expert assumptions. 
Conclusions: Democratizing Agbiotech? 
 
In the Introduction I posed three questions: About state sponsorship of participatory TA for agbiotech, 
about the aims of these exercises, and about their relevance for democratizing the debate. Now we see 
that in responding to or anticipating public concerns about agbiotech, participatory TA exercises were 
sponsored with diverse, overlapping, even contradictory aims. From various deficit models of public 
unease, sponsors and other advocates sought: to democratize technology, to educate the public, to 
counter “extreme” views, to gauge public attitudes, to guide institutional reforms, and to manage 
societal conflicts. Such aims had a bearing on the design, management, staging and process of each 
exercise.  Each process manifested diverse accounts of technology, the public, expertise and 
democracy (cf. Joss 2005a).   
In these TA exercises, individuals were pre-selected to participate in a group process, 
questioning expert claims in order to reach a group view. Participants deliberated the normative, 
value-laden basis of expert claims, thus developing a lay expertise; they went beyond simply 
questioning experts (cf. Kerr 1998; Wakeford 1998). By contrast to a negotiation among interest-
groups, participants addressed the public good by appealing to common societal interests and 
problems (cf. Hamlett 2003).   
However, dominant problem-definitions incorporated or marginalized critical voices. Some 
problems were treated as common ones for group deliberation, while others were ignored or 
marginalized as uncommon ones, inconvenient for a group consensus or for a thinkable government 
policy. Some participants questioned whether agbiotech would provide a means for sustainable 
agriculture and a benign control over the agri-food chain; others suggested the need for alternatives. 
These questions were generally channeled into regulatory criteria and were reduced to control 
measures.   
In such ways, participatory TA exercises biotechnologized democracy. The innovation 
trajectory was protected as societal progress, partly by diverting any challenge into managerial 
problems. Discussion generally focused on appropriate regulatory arrangements for agbiotech, 
represented as a series of potentially beneficial products; at issue was how to minimize risks and 
maximize benefits. Citizen roles were modeled according to the biophysical “risk” frameworks of EU 
and/or national legislation, thus generating conflict over such roles.   
In analogous ways, public participation in EU agbiotech regulatory procedures manifest 
tensions between broad comments submitted and official “scientific” criteria for relevant evidence 
(Bora and Hausendorf 2006; Ferretti 2007). By serving a statutory procedure, science closes the 
factual debate; politics is excluded by pre-determined concepts of risk, nature, citizen, public, and 
others.  
More generally, “wherever a sharp political controversy appears within the context of a rather 
narrow legal-procedural framework for citizen participation, we can expect a variety of depoliticized 
positions with different frames of reference” (Bora 2008). Through such procedures, conflicts over 
societal futures can be managed “by re-absorbing discourses of polarity into a system of ‘legitimate 
differences’ and by defining the locations where differences can be articulated,” as anticipated by a 
critical analysis a decade earlier (Gottweis 1998).   
Regardless of other views held by TA participants, any wider deliberation was constrained: by 
a search for consensus, by the design of each exercise, and by the government policy framework. This 
overall context limited what could be said with influence on the process, and thus what roles could be 
performed credibly by participants (cf. Hajer, 2005). The process internalized and reinforced policy 
assumptions about agbiotech as essential progress – albeit perhaps warranting more rigorous, publicly 
accountable regulation. Through a discursive depoliticization, contentious issues were displaced onto 
the management problems of an inevitable future, as in neoliberal governance more generally (cf. 
Goven 2006; Pestre 2008). Consequently, tensions arose between discussing a “common” problem – 
how to make agbiotech safe or acceptable – versus encompassing problems of political-economic 
control, innovation choices and societal futures.   
These tensions took the form of various boundary conflicts, which erupted more starkly in 
some cases. In the German TA exercise, an extreme case, the NGO representatives could maintain 
their official expert status only by accepting a risk-benefit framework. Instead they rejected these 
terms for participation, demanded a broadly comparative assessment, and thus were relegated to the 
lay public or irrational objectors. In the 2003 UK Public Dialogue, the official structure nominally 
separated all relevant issues into three components – public concerns, scientific risk assessment, and 
economic benefits. Accordingly, expert matters were formally separated from other issues for 
discussion by lay participants. Despite this official tripartite structure, all of the issues became mixed 
in practice; their boundaries were both contested and policed. 
In the design and management of TA exercises, then, boundaries are imposed – between 
biotechnological imperatives versus alternative options, between scientific versus policy issues, as 
well as between expert versus lay roles – which close down issues. By contesting those boundaries, 
some participants open up policy issues and perform different models of the public, implying broader 
roles for citizens.  These performative interactions produce different understandings of the policy 
problem (cf. Hajer 2005).   
If analyzed in this way public engagement can “clarify what conflict is really about” (de 
Marchi 2003). 
In each TA exercise, issues are opened up beyond the government policy framework, though they 
remain more narrow than in the parallel public debate. Ultimately the process reinforces official 
boundaries between scientific and extra-scientific issues, as well as between expert and lay roles 
(though these boundaries take different forms across the national cases). Agbiotech is being co-
produced along with particular models of expertise, citizenship and their relationship. Institutions are 
created or adapted in designing and managing each TA process accordingly.   
To some extent, state-sponsored participatory TA exercises anticipate, stimulate or reinforce 
policy changes which enhance the state’s accountability for regulatory frameworks. Such outcomes 
depend upon a longer-term socio-political agency beyond the TA exercise and its panel.  However, the 
TA exercises do not help publics hold the state accountable for its commitment to agbiotech as an 
objective imperative.   
What does this mean for efforts to democratize technology (e.g. Stirling 2005:229)? In the 
state-sponsored cases analyzed here, participatory methods and representative democracy do not seem 
complementary. Or perhaps they are perversely so. In performing publics, participation symbolically 
sets boundaries on citizen roles and closes down innovation (non)choices. By default, if not by design, 
such issues are channeled into regulatory arenas, which thereby carry the burden of conflicts over 
societal futures. Thus state-sponsored participatory TA readily complements neoliberal representative 
democracy and its unaccountability, while reproducing its contradictions through contested 
boundaries.   
In order to open up societal choices, participatory exercises should:  
• Synchronise with key periods of government decision-making.  
• Facilitate overlaps between ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ roles.  
• Examine the assumptions and limits of ‘risk’ frameworks.  
• Encourage scrutiny of ‘technical’ aspects as value-laden, socio-political issues.  
• Explore the societal problems that supposedly need a technological solution while also 
considering alternatives, especially as regards who may be empowered or disempowered.  
 
Such features may provide some scope for influence by activists beforehand and by participants within 
the exercises.  Likewise those features should be evaluated as a basis for judging whether or how 
participation can truly help to democratise technology choices. Regardless of state-sponsored 
exercises, the overall prospects will depend upon wider, autonomous forms of participation — neither 
sponsored nor welcomed by state bodies.  
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